Seventh Circuit Review

In a day when companies invest millions of dollars in research and development and the United States Patent and Trademark Office grants upwards of 140,000 utility patents per year, intellectual property rights are more powerful than ever before. Yet, protecting competition and consumer welfare through the antitrust laws is equally important to our country’s economy. Unfortunately, in Schor v. Abbott Laboratories, the Seventh Circuit let antitrust considerations fall by the wayside at the expense of upholding patent rights. In order for the antitrust and patent laws to achieve this mutual goal of protecting consumers by promoting competition, they must each be applied evenhandedly. This Comment will present an approach that the Seventh Circuit should have adopted that would appropriately address the concerns of both the patent and antitrust laws. [Hide Abstract]

The probate exception to federal jurisdiction prohibits federal courts from hearing cases involving matters related to the probate of wills or administration of estates. Though it has traditionally been applied in the context of diversity, the courts are split on its applicability in federal question cases. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Marshall clarifies the scope of the exception in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, but what about its application in other federal question cases? In Jones v. Brennan, which involved a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out probate proceedings, the Seventh Circuit chose not to follow the Supreme Court’s trend of narrowing the application of the exception and instead broadened it by holding it applicable to federal question cases. This Comment analyzes the effect that the Marshall decision has on cases involving the probate exception, specifically in the Seventh Circuit, and how that precedent should be used as a basis for formulating a clearer and narrower approach to the exception’s application to federal question cases. [Hide Abstract]

After Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., a court of appeals has no power to order either the entry of judgment for an appellant or a new trial based on the legal sufficiency of the evidence where that appellant failed to move for such an order pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after the civil jury returned a verdict for the appellee. According to the Seventh Circuit in Fuesting v. Zimmer, this rule does not affect its ability to order a new trial where it finds prejudicial error in the trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence, even though the appellant did not renew its objection in any post-verdict motion. In its view, a party’s compliance with Federal Rule of Evidence 103 in preserving its claim of error on appeal would be rendered meaningless if a court of appeals could not review the error because it was “handcuffed” by the Federal Rules of Procedure. Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit and arguing that a post-judgment motion is not a prerequisite to all appeals, this Note expands on the court’s reasoning in Fuesting by examining the Supreme Court’s Rule 50 jurisprudence and assessing Rule 103’s impact on established federal court procedures. [Hide Abstract]

Sex offender legislation has grown exponentially over the past decade and in conjunction the courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to find such legislation unconstitutional. Civil commitment, public registration, and residency restrictions have uniformly been upheld. However, how far can the courts continue this trend without stripping away the fundamental rights and interests of sex offenders. This issue is explored in light of a piece of legislation directed at banning a specific sex offender from the city parks. [Hide Abstract]

Taxpayer standing has generally been prohibited by a line of Supreme Court cases with one narrow exception – if it involves a congressional statute that violates the Establishment Clause. This Note examines whether the Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted Supreme Court precedent as permitting taxpayer standing when the executive branch allegedly violated the Establishment Clause with unearmarked funds appropriated from Congress. Furthermore, this Note examines whether the Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc was proper even though the three judge panel expanded a long standing Supreme Court exception. Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the controversy warranted Supreme Court intervention, yet the denial of rehearing en banc made the three judge panel’s opinion the law of the land until the Supreme Court accepts certiorari. [Hide Abstract]

The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") supplements states’ law enforcement efforts against chronic violent offenders by substantially raising the penalty for armed criminals with past “violent felony” convictions. The ACCA defines the term “violent felony” by giving several specific examples and then adding a catch-all clause. One question that has continued to face courts since the ACCA’s enactment is what constitutes a violent felony under the catch-all clause. The Seventh Circuit recently categorized the offense of drunk driving as a “violent felony” under the catch-all clause and qualified drunk driving as a predicate act subject to recidivist sentence enhancement under the ACCA. In light of drunk driving’s non-violent nature, however, the Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the ACCA’s predicate acts blurs the distinction between crimes of violence and crimes of neglect and allows excessive penalties to be imposed on crimes that Congress did not intend for heightened punishment. This Comment examines the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation and concludes that the Seventh Circuit should not have enlarged the ACCA’s predicate acts to include negligent drunk driving. [Hide Abstract]

A plea bargain allows an individual, accused of a crime, an opportunity to reduce their sentence by bargaining with the prosecution. Although such agreements often stipulate that the accused waive certain constitutional rights, the conditions attached to a bargained-for-probation sentence are not beyond judicial review. Normally, courts examine the constitutionality of the probationary condition, but in United States v. Barnett, the Seventh Circuit summarily upheld the suspicionless search of a probationer upon the consent/contract theory. This Comment contends that the consent/contract theory employed by the Seventh Circuit improperly hooks the crook by upholding unreasonable probationary conditions that violate the constitution on the questionable basis that a convict voluntarily consents to conditions that they cannot avoid. [Hide Abstract]

When the United States Supreme Court instructed federal appellate courts to use a "reasonableness" standard of review following U.S. vs. Booker, a significant question remained: what role do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines play when determining whether a sentence is “reasonable”? While the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari for this very question, the Seventh Circuit has chosen to grant sentences falling within the range provided by the Guidelines a presumption of reasonableness. In doing so, however, the court has neither provided convincing justification nor remained consistent in its application. This Comment will first trace the development of the presumption within the Seventh Circuit, consider the court’s rationales, and discuss whether a presumption of reasonableness can be harmonized with Booker’s remedial opinion and the statutory language of § 3553(a). Next, it will examine the sometimes inconsistent application of the presumption within the Seventh Circuit. Finally, this Comment will examine the upcoming Supreme Court decision and discuss its ramifications for sentencing within the Seventh Circuit. [Hide Abstract]

In Summers v. State Street Bank & Trust Company, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was asked whether State Street Bank & Trust Company, a directed trustee of United Airlines’ employee stock ownership plan, acted imprudently by failing to cause the plan to sell its United stock after the company suffered massive financial losses in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Ultimately, the court found that although State Street, as a directed trustee, was bound by certain fiduciary duties under ERISA, it did not act imprudently by continuing to follow the named fiduciary’s instruction to maintain the United stock, even as the stock’s value continued to plummet. This Comment discusses the Summers decision. Specifically, it focuses on how the decision, while in some ways consistent with ERISA, ultimately breaks away from both the underlying policies and language of ERISA. This Comment also analyses a United States Department of Labor Bulletin and how the Summers decision failed to utilize the standard that it offers. [Hide Abstract]

Under Indiana’s Telephone Solicitation of Consumers statute telemarketers are prohibited from calling all households who opt to place their numbers on the statewide do-not-call list. This prohibition exempts charities, as long as they refrain from using professional telemarketing companies, and rely solely on volunteers or in-house employees. For many charities, particularly ones supporting unpopular causes, telemarketing represents the most successful manner in which they can inform people of their goals and raise money. Charitable solicitation has long been recognized as a protected form of free speech, and any restriction on that right protected by constitutional scrutiny. However, in ruling on the constitutionality of the Indiana statute the Seventh Circuit relied on a mere balancing test rather than the more traditional level of scrutiny. This Comment argues that, by improperly reading Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh Circuit applied the wrong test. While the Seventh Circuit may still have stumbled upon the correct ruling, the rationale behind it failed to give the level of constitutional review which a restriction on the freedom of speech deserves. [Hide Abstract]

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the United States Supreme Court held that a New Jersey public accommodations law could not compel the Boy Scouts to accept homosexual scoutmasters. In Christian Legal Society v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit overextended this precedent when it held that the Southern Illinois Law School could not refuse official recognition of the Christian Law Society because the Society refused to accept homosexual members. By deciding the case on an incomplete record and declining to apply a narrow reading of Dale, the Seventh Circuit exposed to attack all regulations protecting homosexuals. [Hide Abstract]

In City of Chicago v. United States Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”), the Seventh Circuit held that the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 effectively ended the long running debate over the issue of whether the contents of the Firearms Trace System databases, which the City of Chicago had requested from ATF and believed it was entitled to under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), could be disclosed to the public. After the passage of several riders contained within federal appropriations legislation precluding the use of federal funding to retrieve the requested data, and two prior Seventh Circuit decisions holding that the City nonetheless had a right to access the data, the court interpreted the 2005 rider as cutting off all access to the databases in question from the public. The court’s unwavering focus on the apparent intent of Congress in passing the 2005 rider clouded its interpretation of the actual text and structure of the rider and resulted in an unwarranted substantive change in FOIA. [Hide Abstract]

In a case of first impression, the Seventh Circuit misinterpreted naturalization statutes to hold that a good moral character requirement is applicable to aliens who served honorably in the military during times of war. The obligation of naturalizing aliens to show good moral character is listed among the residency requirements of 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427. However, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 excuses alien wartime veterans from making this showing by exempting them from the residency requirements in 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427. In supporting its position that alien wartime veterans must prove good moral character in order to naturalize, the Seventh Circuit misquoted a key naturalization statute and misinterpreted several others. The Seventh Circuit should have held that, based on a plain reading of 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1427 and 1440, a showing of good moral character is not required from alien wartime veterans seeking to naturalize. [Hide Abstract]

Section 13(d) of the Williams Act was meant to insure that public shareholders were provided adequate information about the qualifications and intentions of third parties making cash tender offers or acquiring large blocks of shares in publicly held companies as a means to possibly contest company control. This Note discusses the cases of Edelson v. Ch’ien and Indiana National Corporation v. Rich, where the Seventh Circuit defined the scope of Section 13(d)’s implied cause of action and discussed standing to sue under the statute. In Indiana National, the Seventh Circuit took a broad stance apropos Section 13(d), allowing for expansive protection under the statute. However, in Edelson, the court restricted Section 13(d)’s scope arguing that its implied private right of action applies only in the context of a tender offer or other similar contest for control. This Note discusses the implications of the Seventh Circuit’s restriction of Section 13(d)’s implied cause of action. [Hide Abstract]

Has deference to administrative regulation gone too far in its impact on American corporations and consequently become to great a foe to American corporations in a global marketplace? In the wake of the widespread corporate scandals, many of the regulations enacted are aimed at combating corporate fraud. Recently, in Square D Co. v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of one such regulation, requiring taxpayers to utilize the cash basis method of accounting to deduct interest payments made to tax-exempt foreign related parties. This Note examines where this regulation fits with other similarly aimed provisions; the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for upholding this regulation; arguments for a more narrow construction of the power allocated to the Secretary of the Treasury; and concludes that, based on the overarching purpose of preventing corporate fraud, the Seventh Circuit’s decision was correct in substance but was overly deferential to administrative regulation and ignored many compelling arguments that support its decision. [Hide Abstract]