Seventh Circuit Review

Judges have traditionally followed three basic restrictive rules on motions for summary judgment: the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the credibility of witnesses is not to be evaluated, and contradicting evidence is not to be weighed. Nonetheless, federal judges have read the Supreme Court’s 1986 “Summary Judgment Trilogy” as a directive to be more receptive to summary judgment in ways that are more striking than anything articulated in those three cases. As a result, judges have taken the post-Trilogy liberalization of the summary judgment standard as an invitation to assess and weigh evidence as much as a juror would.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tolan v. Cotton, however, evidences the Court’s renewed emphasis on the proper role of a federal judge at the summary judgment stages of litigation, especially in civil rights cases involving purely testimonial evidence. Failing to heed the Court’s warnings in Tolan, the Seventh Circuit majority in Colbert v. City of Chicago neglected to adhere to the fundamental principles of a motion for summary judgment by implicitly resolving credibility disputes in favor of the moving party—Chicago Police Officers. This article concludes by applauding Judge David Hamilton, who penned a dissent in which he criticized the rose-tinted glasses with which the majority read the defendant officers’ barebones denial of all responsibility and properly framed the case as one which raises larger issues about how courts should address claims of law enforcement misconduct.

The Seventh Circuit formally adopted this two-step means-end test in Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), where it invalidated several Chicago gun control ordinances that effectively banned the construction of all live firing ranges within the city limits. The firing-range ordinances were enacted after the Supreme Court had struck down the City’s total ban on handgun ownership. After the three-judge panel in Ezell I struck down the firing-range ban, the City enacted a new scheme of zoning and distancing requirements for live ranges as well as a ban on minors under 18 entering the ranges.

In Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell II), the same majority from Ezell I again invalidated the Chicago firing-range ordinances under the two-step test. In both Ezell I & II, the majority concluded that the right to live-range training to maintain proficiency in firearms was closely connected to the core right of self-defense protected under the Second Amendment, thus the court applied a heightened standard of review akin to strict scrutiny. This article examines Ezell II in the context of the evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence in the Federal Courts, and argues that (1) the heightened level of review akin to strict scrutiny was inappropriate based on the nature of the conduct at issue, and (2) regulations like the firing-range ordinance should be viewed as akin to “time, place, and manner” restrictions and subjected to at most intermediate scrutiny review. With its decision in Ezell II, the Seventh Circuit has left Chicago with a narrow constitutional path forward as the City seeks to enact meaningful legislation to combat a gun violence epidemic. The time will soon come for the en banc court to clarify the Seventh Circuit’s approach, so that reasonable gun control measures are not inappropriately invalidated.

The Seventh Circuit analyzed an Eighth Amendment Bivens action in Estate of Miller v. Marberry. The case involved a prisoner in the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, who was supposed to be restricted to a lower bunk because he had a brain tumor that caused him to lose feeling in the left half of his body. Regardless of the prisoner’s lower-bunk restriction, he was forced to sleep on a top bunk and fell to the floor twice. The second time he fell, he broke his back and suffered multiple injuries. The Seventh Circuit denied his Bivens claim, finding that he had sued the wrong parties. This holding directly contradicts Seventh Circuit precedent holding that turning a blind eye to a prisoner’s needs can establish deliberate indifference, and that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In this comment, I will discuss the evolution of the Bivens action, and discuss why the Seventh Circuit decided this case incorrectly.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that a jury could not reasonably find from the evidence that the defendants took longer than was necessary to assess Lewis’s medical issue and get him treatment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Lewis’s medical needs.

This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided Lewis v. McLean because it failed to consider precedent, which requires a plaintiff to place into the record verifying medical evidence that an alleged delay in medical treatment had a detrimental effect. Further, this Note argues that the courts should return to applying the cruel and unusual punishment standard, following the text of the Constitution. Finally, this Note argues that state law medical malpractice claims are best suited for actions against medical professionals.

In Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, a debtor collector, relied on the then-binding judicial interpretation in Newsom to file a debt collection claim against the debtor in the first municipal district. While the case was pending, the Seventh Circuit adopted a new interpretation of the venue provision under the FDCPA in Suesz, resulting in the debt collector’s initial choice of venue being wrong under the new interpretation. The debtor collector voluntarily dismissed the claim against the debtor. However, the debtor brought a suit against the debt collector, alleging that the debt collector’s choice of venue violated the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit en banc held that Suesz applied retroactively to Oliva; therefore, the debt collector violated the FDCPA’s venue provision. The court further held that the bona fide error defense did not apply to mistakes of law, even if the debt collector relied in good faith on a binding court’s interpretation of the law, which later had been overruled. This Note argues that Suesz should not have been applied retroactively to Oliva, and, even if it applied, the bona fide error defense should have excused the debt collector’s liability.

The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are unified in demanding strict compliance with the “safe harbor” requirement. The Seventh Circuit, however, has developed precedent that mere “substantial compliance” is sufficient to impose sanctions on an offending party. In Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., the Seventh Circuit settled on a flimsy endorsement of its substantial compliance interpretation of Rule 11(c)(2). This note explores why the Seventh Circuit decided not to overturn its controversial precedent and whether the circuit is likely to take the steps to align itself with the bulk of circuits that already demand strict compliance with the Rule 11 “safe harbor” requirement in the future.

Ashton Whitaker, a transgender boy in the Kenosha School District of Wisconsin, felt those real effects when his school enforced its unwritten bathroom policy on him and barred him from using the boys’ bathroom. He was granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the school from enforcing its policy, which the school district appealed to the Seventh Circuit. Despite the current political climate that has amplified anti-transgender sentiment, the Seventh Circuit applied existing law in coming to the only plausible conclusion: public schools cannot lawfully prohibit transgender students from using the bathroom in accordance with their gender identity.

The school district filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, where it was supported by several amicus briefs from various conservative interest groups. Those briefs, which I have dubbed the “animus” briefs, reek of anti-transgender sentiment and fail to even address the Seventh Circuit’s sound legal analysis. This Comment discusses that existing precedent upon which the Seventh Circuit came to its conclusion, and further urges the Supreme Court to do the same if and when it addresses the issue.

This Article uses the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in In re Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation as a springboard to discuss the need for sweeping changes to class action litigation as it exists today. This Article will argue that regardless of a settlement’s purported monetary relief, courts should elevate the value of injunctive relief in order to preserve class members’ rights to subsequent action. Additionally, it will advocate for Congress to pass the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, thereby eliminating unmeritorious complaints while simultaneously ensuring that class counsel does not receive benefits exorbitantly disproportionate to the class members themselves.

In Hollins v. Regency Corp., the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining if an unpaid trainee qualified as an employee and was entitled to her unpaid wages. Here, a cosmetology student claimed she was doing work beyond that of a “trainee,” such as cleaning the bathrooms and tending the cash register. The court determined that it would create its own test by combining the four tests for the various circuit courts; they called it “the economic reality” test. This article argues that there needs to be a strict universal test to determine if an unpaid intern is an employee as defined by the FLSA and Title VII. The test should consider two questions: (1) Are all the tasks assigned to the intern associated in furtherance of their educational or career goals and is the intern aware of how it will further their goals? and (2) did the intern replace any of employer’s employees? Applying a strict universal test gives the courts, interns, and employees a clear understanding of the parameters between an intern and an employee so that no one can cross the line.

In Anicich v. Home Depot, the Seventh Circuit was faced with this dilemma. In Anicich, the plaintiff’s daughter was brutally murdered by her supervisor at Home Depot. While the murder happened in another state hundreds of miles from where they worked, there seemed to be an inextricable link between the crime and the fact of employment. Faced with these facts, the Seventh Circuit applied a novel interpretation of the Restatement of Torts. Analogizing supervisory authority to employer chattels, the court created a new way to satisfy the Restatement’s principles and establish proximate cause for negligent hiring and negligent retention. In doing so, the court may have created a new avenue for employer liability without establishing any clear limits.